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The Future of U.S.-Colombian Relations

Introduction

Colombia has been one of the United States’ closest
allies in the region, stretching back to the 1950s. Colombia was the only Latin American country to join
the Korean War in a direct military role. In 1951, the
first 1,000 Colombian soldiers disembarked in South
Korea where they maintained a military presence
until the end of the war. During the 1960s and 1970s,
Colombia became one of the largest recipients of
United States assistance in Latin America. The assistance was designed to enable Colombia to develop
economically through industrialization, agrarian, and
social reforms and helped solidify Colombian-U.S.
military relations.1 Colombia’s support of the United
States during the war and the U.S.’ economic support
of Colombia during the 1960s and 1970s fostered a
multi-faceted, long-lasting diplomatic and military
relationship between the two countries that has evolved, but remained strong for over half a century.
A turning point for the U.S.-Colombia relationship
was the adoption of Plan Colombia in 2000. More
than an assistance program, Plan Colombia was a
partnership between the U.S. and Colombian governments to combat narcotics trafficking, insecurity
and terrorism and shore up the Colombian state’s
capacity to control its territory. That relationship has
led to long-standing and deep connections between
both countries’ militaries, close professional and personal relations among the armed forces, diplomats,
businesspeople, academics, and policymakers and ultimately contributed to the success of Plan Colombia
in achieving its primary objectives. It was those close
relationships that also led to the Colombia-U.S. Trade
Promotion Agreement (TPA), Colombia’s observer
status in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and its pending accession to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD).
Political, security, and diplomatic conditions have
shifted in both countries. The peace agreement and
efforts to peacefully integrate the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias Colombianas (FARC) into Colombian society and economy have changed the security
dynamics and challenges. So too has the on-going
collapse and humanitarian crisis across the border in
Venezuela, leading to—as of this writing—1.3 million
Venezuelan refugees living in Colombia and illicit
connections between the other guerrilla group in
Colombia, the Ejercito de Liberación Nacional (ELN),
former FARC combatants, and other illegal groups on
the Venezuela-Colombia border.
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According to a report by Insight Crime: “Since the
mass influx of desperate Venezuelan migrants began
in this region, gangs have operated under the premise
that whoever controls the international crossings
controls everything. Also, the border’s official closure
by Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro in February
turned into the perfect opportunity for groups like
La Línea to gain strength.” Recently, according to the
report, the criminal group La Línea has gained the
upper hand on illicit commerce and transport along
the Colombian-Venezuelan border. They have been
able to do this by battling another criminal organization, Los Rastrojos, “which led to several homicides in
Cúcuta and Puerto Santander” and by allying with La
Frontera gang.2
At the same time, Colombia’s traditional two-party system has become attenuated, leading to the rise of new
movements and polarization between the democratic
left and the democratic right. Diplomatic gaffes and insults from the White House have also rocked relations,
ricocheting across Colombian media.
Despite these changes and potential tensions, Colombian-U.S. relations will remain strong, based on the
extensive foundation of security, diplomatic and economic cooperation that has developed over the past
60 years. However, the nature of the relationship will
change, and factors such as political uncertainty and
change should be carefully observed. Contingency
planning and potential adjustments in the relationship across sectors may become necessary.
Colombia remains both institutionally, and at the
level of popular opinion one of the most pro-American countries in the region, and its armed forces are
closely tied to the U.S. Defense Department, its military and its different institutions including the U.S.
Southern Command—through training, operations,
equipment, and collaboration outside Colombia.
However, as was seen in the case of Venezuela—which
also had one of the most pro-American publics in the
region—change can occur quickly and unexpectedly,
as was the case in Venezuela after 1999. Well-established points of U.S.-Venezuela military-to-military
collaboration, professionalism of the armed forces
and separation between the military and politics was
quickly rolled back in the service of an ideological
political project. Will or even could that happen in
Colombia in the next ten years?
That is what we set out to answer here. We do this primarily by examining Colombia and Colombian-U.S.

1. Relations with the United States. U.S. Library of Congress, www.countrystudies.us/colombia/98.htm [Last accessed 6/18/19]
2. Olaya, Angela, “‘La Línea’ Gang Takes Deadly Hold on Colombia-Venezuela Border.” InSight Crime, May 21, 2019, www.insightcrime.
org/news/analysis/la-linea-gang-colombia-venezuela-border/ [Last accessed 6/18/19]
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relations through five channels: politics and public
opinion; security; economy and trade; multilateral
relations; and diplomatic relations. We start with politics and public opinion because Colombian politics
and its party system are undergoing change. That
change will affect the other elements of the U.S.-Colombian relationship, including security cooperation
and economics.

Politics and Public Opinion

While Colombia’s second-round presidential election
in 2018 gathered most of the public attention for the
choices—between a staunchly conservative candidate, Iván Duque, and a strongly leftist candidate,
Gustavo Petro—the roots of the polarization received
less attention. In the past twenty years, Colombia’s
traditional two-party system has been in decline.
Since independence, the Conservatives and Liberal
parties—or, perhaps more aptly, party machines—had
dominated Colombian politics, their fierce rivalry
even erupting in 1948 to 1958 into the civil war known
simply as La Violencia. The internecine bloodletting
was ended when General Rojas Pinilla (from 1952 and
1957) and the Liberal and Conservatives eventually
agreed to form a power sharing agreement called the
National Front. In the democratic years that followed
the National Front, the Liberals and Conservatives
effectively swapped the presidential office between
themselves and the two parties dominated the
nation’s bicameral legislature. The National Front
ended in 1974, leading to the beginning of the end
of their bipartisan dominance. The Constitution of
1991 effectively put the nails in the coffin of the twoparty system. Decentralization reforms3 and popular
anger over corruption and the inability of the state
to control crime, narcotics trafficking and insecurity
led to the growth of a series of small local movements.
The 1991 Constitution allowed for the registration
of dozens of political parties including the former
guerrilla movement, M-19, which had played a role in
the drafting of the new constitution.
The decline of the two-party system and its dispersion to other movements and candidates became
apparent in the 1998 presidential elections when the
two leading candidates only received a combined
49.1 percent of the popular vote in the first round.
The party system briefly converged again with the
candidacy and two-term presidency of Álvaro Uribe
who, while running as an “independent Liberal,”
brought elements of the Conservative Party base
with him after the public failure of Conservative
President Andrés Pastrana’s peace process in the
previous term. Uribe’s term temporarily halted the

4

dispersion of votes across the party system but ended
the two-party system by creating a new party and
drawing from both of Colombia’s traditional parties.
Uribismo’s Partido de la U split both the Conservative
and Liberal parties, and both struggled to reach 18%
in the Senate while Uribe’s personal vehicle Partido
de la U (a supposed reference to unity but everyone
knew the U stood for Uribe) received 20 percent.
In both of Uribe’s elections, the votes of the top two
vote getters in the first round totaled slightly over 84
percent. By 2014, in the re-election of Uribe’s former
Defense Minister Juan Manual Santos, the two top
candidates only received 44.9 percent of the vote in
the first round.
The vote totals rebounded in the first round of the
2018 elections to a combined 64.2 percent, but by that
time there was one crucial difference: neither of the
top two vote-getters, Duque or Petro, represented the
traditional Liberal or Conservative parties. The only
candidate representing one of the two once-mighty
party machines, Humberto de la Calle of the Liberal
Party coalition, received only 2 percent of the votes or
just 399,180 of the ballots cast. Unlike the convergence
toward the center that marked the Liberal-Conservative era, the second round in 2018 presented two stark
choices, one from the right promising to undo elements
of Santos’ peace agreement with the FARC, Duque,
and the other a former mayor of Bogotá who had been
removed from office representing a new party, the
Progressive Movement, Petro.
With this fraying of Colombia’s two-party system have come two consequences. The first is the
dispersion of seats in Congress to a range of parties.
Fragmentation had already started, but it took a while
to trickle into the presidential system. In 2002, there
were 15 parties in the Senate and 21 in the lower
chamber. Conservatives and Liberals populated both
Chambers, but the inability to reach a majority made
it difficult to pass legislation. As a result of the 2018
elections, there are now 11 parties in Colombia’s
upper house and 13 parties in its lower house. Should
this continue, the fracturing of the national legislature raises long-term concerns over effective democratic governance.
The second consequence of growing electoral volatility is fragile popular support for presidents. This
fragmentation of presidential support has taken a toll
on the current president. According to surveys conducted at the end of Duque’s first 100 days in power,
the president’s popularity had already sunk to 22
percent, the lowest of any Colombian president that

3. Sabatini, Christopher, “Latin America’s Lost Illusions: Decentralization and Political Parties” Journal of Democracy, April 2003, Vol.
14, (2), pp. 138-150 https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/?s=Sabatini&orderby=score [Last accessed 6/5/19]
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early into his term. Moreover, according to a May 21,
2019 survey, 60 percent of Colombians disapproved of
Duque and his policies. The president is particularly
unpopular with voters between the ages of 18 and 34,
with 25 to 26 percent of Colombians in that age group
supporting the president, according to a February
2019 survey.4
The policy reasons for the president’s unpopularity are multiple. For one, Duque is trapped in the
polarized public opinion surrounding the peace deal.
According to surveys—and the October 2016 popular
referendum on a previous version of the peace deal
which lost—the country is almost evenly split, 50/50
over the final deal. Duque and his Democratic Center
Party were critical of the peace agreement during
the campaign, but in office, he has only taken modest
steps to weaken the deal by underfunding some
projects and offices that were part of the deal and
criticizing the special justice system set up to balance
justice and reconciliation in trying former combatants. However, in doing so, he has pleased neither
side. For Colombians critical of the deal, Duque has
not done enough to repeal it (the FARC still has its ten
congressional seats, for example). For supporters of
the peace deal, Duque’s criticisms of it and attempts
to limit the power and activities of several of the offices charged with implementing it are undermining a
deal in which they believe in.
There have also been some policy stumbles that have
cost Duque popular support. One of them was the
presentation and then retraction of a tax plan. The
controversial proposal, to increase value-added tax,
split the president’s party in Congress and was then
withdrawn, creating the impression of the president’s political clumsiness. According to one survey,
the president’s popularity dropped by 26 points as a
result of the ordeal.5 Colombians have also become
critical of the government’s lack of efforts to combat
corruption. According to a March 2019 survey, 67
percent of Colombians disapprove of how Duque
has tackled state corruption, with only 27 percent
of Colombians approving of his methods. During the
campaign and early in his administration, Duque had
promised a new initiative to address corruption. Instead of bringing forth a package of new policies and
regulations as promised, Duque’s party members have
chosen to support bills that are already in Congress,
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which many Colombians feel do not do enough to hold
politicians accountable.6
All of this raises the question of how and if Colombia’s
party system will re-constitute itself. Elsewhere on
the continent, Peru’s democracy has limped along for
over two decades without a functioning, stable party
system. In that case, presidents have often finished
their terms with near-single-digit-levels of popularity, and one president has resigned; yet with every
election, centrist, democratic candidates have prevailed. To win, candidates, including former presidents
Alan García and Ollanta Humala, have tacked to the
center, thereby precluding the election of more extremist candidates. Could the same occur in Colombia
should a new stable, party system fail to emerge from
the ashes of the past one?
For one, Peru’s limited experience may indicate that
just because a candidate came in a close second in
one presidential election, he or she does not automatically emerge as the front runner on the heels
of an unpopular president’s end of term. In the case
of Colombia, this could mean that Petro or even an
ally is not automatically positioned to coast to the
presidential palace should Duque and his Democratic
Center Party tank in its first or possible second term.
Other centrist candidates will likely emerge to attract
moderate voters across the ideological spectrum.
According to surveys conducted by Mitchell Seligson
at Vanderbilt University, Colombians tend to be more
conservative than citizens in other countries—a tendency proven by the lack of a strong democratic leftist
party until recently.7 This conservative or moderate
political culture will likely favor the emergence of
centrist presidential candidates even in the absence
of an institutionalized, stable party system.
The 2018 elections also demonstrated the extent
to which the peace accord between the Colombian
government and the FARC has polarized the country.
As we describe below under security, President Santos’
peace negotiations and the resulting deal became
deeply divisive. Part of this stems from popular and
political concerns over the balance between justice and
reconciliation struck in the deal that many—on both
sides of the ideological spectrum—felt was too light on
former combatants involved in the killing of citizens,
kidnapping, narcotics trafficking, and other illicit

4. Alesma, Adrian, “Duque’s Approval Recovers Significantly” Colombia Reports, February 4, 2019, https://colombiareports.com/duquesapproval-recovers-significantly/ [Last accessed 6/10/19]
5. June S., “Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations” Congressional Research Service, February 9, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
R43813.pdf [Last accessed 6/10/19]
6. Aux, Juan Jose, “Aprobación De Duque, De Nuevo a La Caída” El Colombiano, April 5, 2019, https://www.elcolombiano.com/zolombia/
politica/desaprobacion-y-aprobacion-presidente-ivan-duque-marzo-2019-GM10496550 [Last accessed 6/10/19]
7. Garcia Sanchez, Migue Rodriguez Raga, Juan Carlos, and Seligson, Mitchell, “Political Culture of Democracy in Colombia, 2013” Latin
America Popular Opinion Project, Vanderbilt University, p. 71.
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activities. These concerns extended to the agreement
to permit former FARC leaders who had not been accused of participating in crimes to form a political party
and participate in electoral politics. As an incentive
to agree to give up their arms for the ballot box, the
deal gave the FARC party five representatives in each
chamber of the bicameral national legislature.
These fears were stoked by the strident public
opposition of former President Uribe (and Santos’
former boss when he was Defense Minister). That the
negotiations were conducted in Communist Cuba and
needed the implicit support of the governments of
Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro across the border
in Venezuela, where many FARC leaders had sought
refuge, also fed into fears among one of Latin America’s
conservative-leaning populations8 that Santos had given chavismo an electoral route to power in Colombia.
The charge was largely alarmist given the deep unpopularity of the FARC in Colombia. Indeed, in the first
congressional elections in which they participated as a
political party, as the Alternative Revolutionary Party
of the Community (Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria
del Común or FARC) the FARC political movement
only won .18 percent of the vote for the lower house and
.29 percent of the vote for the upper house, not enough
to gain any seats in either house, but enough for the five
seats guaranteed under the peace deal.
Just as Colombians in their political opinions tend to
skew more conservative than citizens from the majority of Latin American countries, they also tend to be
more pro-U.S. In 2017, according to Pew World Values
surveys, after President Trump’s election, Colombia
remained one of the most pro-American countries
in the region, with 51 percent of Colombians having
favorable views of the United States, tied with Peru and
above the regional median of 49 percent. Colombia was
followed by Brazil (50 percent have a favorable view),
Venezuela (47 percent have a favorable view), Chile (39
percent have a favorable view), Argentina (35 percent
have a favorable view) and Mexico at the bottom, with
30 percent of Mexicans having a favorable view of its
neighbor to the north. The same report also revealed
that 56 percent of Colombians have favorable views
of Americans themselves. At the same time, though,
according to a Pew World Surveys report, only 17
percent of Colombians trust President Trump to do the
“right thing in world affairs”—in contrast to an average
of 56 percent of Colombians in surveys conducted
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between 2014 and 2016 that trusted former President
Barack Obama to “do the right thing.”
These positive attitudes toward the U.S. are due in
no small part to the large numbers of U.S. citizens
of Colombian descent and Colombians living in the
United States. As of May 2015, just under 1 million
Colombian immigrants and their children live in
the United States. Colombia is the largest South
American source of immigration, 14th largest source
overall, and represents 1.7 percent of the U.S.-foreign
born population. Most immigrants arrived fleeing the
narcotics-fueled violence and civil war of the 1980s
and 1990s and are heavily concentrated in greater
Miami and New York City areas. As a reflection of
their importance to families in Colombia and their
attitudes toward the United States, Colombia’s
U.S.-based diaspora is their most significant source of
remittances, in 2012 totaling $1.3 billion.9
Nevertheless, public opinion and attitudes toward a
country and its people are thin reeds to lean on for
sustaining healthy, productive bilateral relations.
Public opinion can be fickle, especially when there
are external stresses that can affect it. And Colombia
currently has plenty of pressures, many of which are
likely to mount. Among them: Venezuelan refugees,
imperfect disarmament and integration of FARC, rising criminality and insecurity along the border area
with Venezuela, and a potentially unpredictable and
inconsistent ally, the United States. In the case of the
latter, U.S. domestic politics—in good and bad ways—
can also help to shape Colombian attitudes toward the
country, especially given the close relations between
the two countries.
At the same time, Colombians demonstrate concerning levels of distrust, if not a rejection, of their
political system and its politicians. This pool of festering citizen frustration is evident in the most recent
surveys by Vanderbilt University’s Latin America
Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). According to their
2016-2017 surveys, only 10 percent of Colombians
have confidence in their political parties, making
them one of the most distrustful of their party system
in the hemisphere. Only Brazilians (9 percent), Chileans (8.5 percent) and Peruvians (7.5 percent) have
less confidence in their political parties. Accordingly,
only 24 percent of Colombians say that they trust
elections, the third lowest in the region, just above
Brazil (23.4 percent) and Haiti (18.4 percent).10 At the

8. Garcia Sanchez, Miguel, et al.
9. The Colombian Diaspora in the United States. Migration Policy Institute, May 2015, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/
files/publications/RAD-ColombiaII.pdf [Last accessed 6/18/19]
10. Cohen, Mollie, Lupu, Noam, and Zechmeister, Elizabeth, “The Political Culture of Democracy in the Americas, 2016/17,” Latin
America Popular Opinion Project, August 2017, Vanderbilt University, pp.15 https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2016/AB2016-17_
Comparative_Report_English_V2_FINAL_090117_W.pdf [Last accessed 6/10/19]
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same time, 74.9 percent of Colombians believe half or
more of their politicians are corrupt, the fourth highest in the region after Brazil (83.4 percent), Mexico
(72.2 percent) and Peru (77 percent).11
Perhaps it is no surprise then that just a bare majority
of Colombians, 53.3 percent, agree with the statement
“… democracy may have problems, but it is better than
any other form of government…” More positively,
though, despite citizen concerns over security and
low levels of support for democracy, support for a military coup to address crime remains relatively low in
Colombia. When responding to the statement, “When
there is a lot of crime, a military take-over of the state
would be justified” only 33 percent of respondents
agreed, compared to regional highs of 59.3 percent in
Jamaica and 55.3 percent in Peru, and the regional
low of 23.3 percent in the United States.
Large segments of Colombians are distrustful of the
police. According to surveys, 17.4 percent of Colombians felt victimized by corruption as a whole and 12.4
percent felt that they had been specifically victimized
by a police officer through actions such as being asked
for a bribe. 18.3 percent of Colombians felt that bribes
are justified and had some degree of tolerance toward
police corruption. Confidence in police efficiency was
also low, 16.6 percent of Colombians felt that the police
would take more than three hours to respond to their
call. Colombians also have a deep distrust of the judicial system, with 69 percent of Colombians believing
that the Colombian justice system would give little
to no punishment to a guilty person.12 According to a
2017 Universidad de los Andes report, in Tumaco and
Mestesas, a port city and rural town, citizens have little
to no trust in most public institutions, particularly
those who have played some part in the peace agreement. Citizens have no trust in “criminal groups” or the
national police, and have very little trust in the ELN,
armed forces, parliamentary groups, and FARC.13 The
report concludes that there are “low levels of social
trust, as well as low levels of trust toward both local
and central governing institutions.”14 This distrust
is likely the outcome of citizens’ heightened sense of
insecurity as the country goes through various social
and political changes.

Security

The Colombian armed forces have roughly 481,000
members across its three branches—army, navy and
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air force—with its intelligence service. Also, Colombia has a national police force of 180,000. Each
of these forces—all under the Defense Ministry’s
purview—work closely with the United States armed
services and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).
After almost two decades of close collaboration under
Plan Colombia, Colombian, and U.S. officers, civilian
defense officials and soldiers are closely intertwined
professionally and even personally.
U.S.-Colombian military cooperation and collaboration remains strong and is one of the closest military-to-military relations in the hemisphere, if not the
closest. Colombia’s participation in military training
and exchange programs goes back to 1820 when
Colombian military officers and youth came to the
United States to attend the U.S. Military Academy at
West Point and other educational institutions. During
the Cold War, Colombia was the largest supplier of
students to the U.S. Army School of the Americas, and
connections led to the creation of training programs in
Colombia, such as the Lancero course. The relationship has evolved, especially after Plan Colombia, from
what the National Defense University described in
201715 as shifting from “mentorship” or “tutorial” to
one of collaboration and “advice” between “sovereign
equals in pursuit of common interests.”
So, while Colombia has gone from one of the most
active Latin American countries in U.S. military
training programs, those numbers have declined in
recent years as a reflection of that evolving, maturing
relationship. In a sign of the closeness and confidence
in this relationship, SouthCom has named a Colombian officer, Brigadier General Juan Carlos Correa
Consuegra, as the Director of the J7/9 Exercises
and Coalition Affairs Directorate. That relationship
between all levels of the military hierarchies in both
countries is unlikely to change, for reasons of institutional ties, personal relations, and shared visions of
strategy and role. In speaking with Colombian civilian
defense experts and military officers, the respect for
the U.S. military and the relationship is evident.
As part of those maturing ties, the U.S. and Colombian
militaries have conducted joint operations outside
Colombia or outside Colombia-specific areas. Through
SouthCom, the U.S. and Colombian militaries collaborate in Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task
Force Crisis Response Africa (SPMAGTF), and for the

11. Cohen, Mollie, et al., pp.60.
12. Cohen, Mollie, et al.
13. Binningsbø, Helga, et al, Perceptions of and Experience with the Peace Process in Colombia, PRIO & Universidad De Los Andes, 2018,
www.prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=1568&type=publicationfile [Last accessed 6/24/19]
14. Binningsbø, Helga, et al.
15. Miklaucic, Michael and Pinzón, Juan Carlos, “Partnership: The U.S.-Colombia Experience” November 20, 2017, The National
Defense University, https://cco.ndu.edu/News/Article/1375948/14-partnership-the-colombia-usexperience/ [Last accessed 6/5/19]
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FIGURE 1

they are still not the suppliers
of heavy, critical equipment.
U.S., China and Russia military sales to
Much of this materiel and personal
relationship deepened through
Latin America, 2008-2018
Plan Colombia. According to the
COUNTRY
U.S.
China
Russia
State Department, the original
interagency assistance package
Argentina
$106 million
$1 million
$14 million
included $390.5 billion to assist
N/A
Bolivia
$8 million
$46 million
the Colombian government gaining
control over drug-producing reN/A
Brazil
$478 million
$175 million
gions of the country and weakening
the networks and organizations
N/A
$34 million
Colombia
$611 million
involved in their production and
Peru
$37 million
$15 million
$232 million
shipping. Those funds supported training and equipping the
Venezuela
$6 million
$588 million $2.748 billion
second and third counter-narcosource: “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.” SIPRI, www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers [Last accessed 6/10/19]
tics battalions in the Colombian
army and “the procurement and
support of 14 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters ($208
first time, Colombian officials have been integrated
million); procurement, refurbishment, and support
into the leadership team directing that mission. Every
of 30 UH-1H Huey II helicopters ($60 million); and
year, the U.S. military hosts meetings and training
support for 15 UH-1N helicopters ($60 million) for
sessions at U.S. military bases for Colombian troops.
use by the Colombian army.” The assistance package
Most recently this included a 2018 training with
also provided support to enhance U.S. and Colombian
Colombian-U.S. air forces at Davis-Monthan Airforce
narcotics interdiction efforts, in particular: upgrading
Base. This year (2019), Colombian Defense Chief
the radar systems in four U.S. Customs Service P-3
Luis Navarro Jiménez visited SouthCom to discuss
airborne early-warning interdiction aircrafts used to
U.S.-Colombia defense cooperation and joined a
detect and monitor suspect targets destined for the
roundtable with other SouthCom leaders to discuss
United States from cocaine source zones; improving
the command’s mission and its cooperation with Cothe Colombian Air Force OV-10 aircraft; supporlombia and other partners in the region. Colombian
ting Colombia’s riverine interdiction program; and,
military officers and doctors also provided support for
enhancing the Colombian navy’s counter-narcotics
the hospital ship USNS Comfort’s medical assistance
intelligence infrastructure. The Colombian National
mission in 2018 and the ongoing, civilian-led delivery
Police also received extensive inter-agency assistance
of humanitarian aid for vulnerable populations in the
under the initial phases of Plan Colombia that incluregion, including for Venezuelan refugees.
ded funds for: the procurement, training, and support
for two UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters and for 12 UHAnother sign of the close U.S.-Colombia military
1H Huey II helicopters; the purchase of Ayers S2R
relationship is arms sales. The United States remains
T-65 agricultural spray aircraft and OV-10 aircraft;
the largest supplier of military equipment to Colomand for communications equipment, ammunition,
bia and higher per capita than any other country in
spare parts, training, and logistical support.18
Latin America. That commercial relation—and the
maintenance and upgrade ties that come with it—has
also meant that compared to other countries in the
Arguably, as a sign of the two countries’ maturing
region, including U.S. allies, China and Russia are less
relationship, U.S. military assistance now only constiimportant providers of military materiel. (See Figure
tutes a small percentage of Colombia’s overall defense
1.) Most of the equipment purchased from China,
budget. In 2017, total counter-narcotics, security, and
according to Frank Mora, is “[d]rones, transport
military aid to Colombia was $279 million.19 Against
vehicles, boots, camouflage.”16 While this does give
Colombia’s overall defense budget that same year of
$9.7 billion,20 U.S. assistance represented only around
Chinese arms and materiel manufacturers access,
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16. Interview conducted by author with Dr. Frank Mora, April 2019.
17. “Plan Colombia.” U.S. Department of State Archive, U.S. Department of State, March 14, 2001, http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/wha/rls/
fs/2001/1042.htm [Last accessed 6/5/19]
18. Ibid
19. “U.S. Foreign Aid by Country.” Foreign Aid Explorer: Dashboard, USAID Data Services, April 11, 2019, explorer.usaid.gov/cd/COL
[Last accessed 6/5/19]
20. “Colombia- Defense.” Colombia Country Commercial Guide, International Trade Administration, August 17, 2018, www.export.gov/
article?id=Colombia-Defense [Last accessed 6/5/19]
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2.8 percent. Plan Colombia was relatively successful
in countering the country’s multiple insurgencies, extending justice to rural areas and reducing insecurity
generally, but it was largely unsuccessful in reducing
narcotics production and trade. Cocaine continues
to flow into U.S. markets at high rates.21 USAID has
focused its efforts on crop substitution, but aerial
spraying was suspended under the Santos administration, though President Duque has promised to
restart it with the assistance of DEA and the Defense
Department who have provided intelligence and
surveillance by providing tools such as Scan Eagle, an
aerial machine that can track drug trafficking.22

Shifting Security Challenge

The peace agreement between the FARC and the
government negotiated by former President Juan Manuel Santos remains controversial. As cited earlier,
Colombian citizens remain split nearly evenly on
their support/opposition to the peace deal. According
to a Gallup poll from May 2019, 63 percent of Colombians felt that under Duque, the implementation of
the peace deal was going badly. 65 percent of Colombians felt that it would be better to create a peaceful
dialogue with guerrilla and rebel groups until the
peace deal is fully implemented. Seventy four percent
of Colombians felt that the peace deal would not give
a definitive solution to drug trafficking. 63 percent
of Colombians did not feel that the complete truth
would come out through the peace deal. This same
percent also did not think that the peace deal would
lead to fair reparations for victims of the FARC.23
In the Colombian city of Tumaco, 45 percent were
little satisfied with the peace agreement, and felt that
implementation of some or most of the peace accord
components, including but not limited to land and
coca reforms, were off track. 24
While the former president and his supporters maintain that the peace is irreversible, it is unarguably
weakened, both in terms of key government programs
intended to ease the implementation of peace and the
commitment among former combatants. Part of this
is the relentless opposition to the agreement by con-
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servatives—led by former President Álvaro Uribe and
his mentee and current president Iván Duque—that
first led to the popular rejection of the peace deal in an
October 2016 popular referendum.25 In response, the
Santos government re-negotiated parts of the agreement and submitted it to the Congress for its approval.
That opposition has continued with Duque now in
the presidency. Issues of justice for crimes against
humanity committed by the FARC during the 50-year
conflict and the participation of former guerrillas in
the political system—including five guaranteed seats
in each house of the bicameral Colombian Congress—have bred resistance to the deal and the special
Jurisdictions for Peace (Jurisdicción Especial para la
Paz – JEP) established under the agreement to limit
the prosecution of combatants for crimes committed
during the conflict. Reflecting this opposition, in response to the JEP’s 2019 budget request of $116 million,
Duque only provided $92 million. That lack of funding
has forced DEP to cut its presence in half. The Duque
government has also funded the Truth Commissions
and the Special Unit for the Search for Missing Persons at below their requested budget amounts.
Opposition to the peace deal also springs from its
imperfect implementation so far. According to a 2018
report by Notre Dame University’s Kroc Institute, only
23 percent of the “578 peace accord commitments have
begun implementation.”26 At the same time, the unique
and toxic mix of guerrillas, criminal networks and organized crime, involved not just in drug production and
transport but also money laundering, extortion, arms
trafficking, and illegal mining has meant that violence
and insecurity have not decreased as much as hoped.
The demobilization of the FARC and its integration
into peaceful, legal civilian life remains incomplete.
An estimated 3,000 militants have resumed illicit
activities and violence; some of them de-commissioned FARC combatants who turned their supposed
ideological battle into now baldly illicit activities.
Moreover, some are new recruits. That 3,000 represents only about 40 percent of the FARC forces that

21. Gagne, David. “On 15 Year Anniversary, Govt Asks for New Plan Colombia.” InSight Crime, 2 Feb. 2016, www.insightcrime.org/news/
analysis/on-15-year-anniversary-colombia-asks-for-new-plan-colombia/ [Last accessed 6/18/19]
22. U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance Achieved Some Positive Results, but State Needs to Review the Overall U.S. Approach. United States
Government Accountability Office, December, 2018, www.gao.gov/assets/700/695952.pdf.
23. Gallup Poll Colombia #130, Gallup Colombia, May 2019, imgcdn.larepublica.co/cms/2019/05/17085310/031800190000-GALLUPPOLL-130.pdf [Last accessed 6/24/19]
24.Binningsbø, Helga, et al. Perceptions of and Experience with the Peace Process in Colombia. PRIO & Universidad De Los Andes, 2018,
www.prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=1568&type=publicationfile [Last accessed 6/24/19]
25. Brodzinsky, Sibylla. “Colombia Referendum: Voters Reject Peace Deal with Farc Guerrillas.” The Guardian, October 3, 2016, www.
theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/02/colombia-referendum-rejects-peace-deal-with-farc [Last accessed 6/18/19]
26. “Second Kroc Institute Report Shows Steady Progress of Peace Accord Implementation in Colombia.” Kroc Institute for
International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, August 9, 2018, kroc.nd.edu/news-events/news/second-kroc-institute-reportshows-steady-progress-of-peace-accord-implementation-in-colombia/ [Last accessed 6/10/19]
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existed just before the completion of the peace deal. To
be sure, insecurity and violence have improved, and the
country is no longer officially at war with the FARC,
a war that claimed over 220,000 lives over its 50-year
span. Their partial continued activity as an armed,
criminal presence has brought into doubt one of the
central hopes of the peace process: the achievement of
security and peace, especially in rural Colombia, where
varying levels of conflict have raged since La Violencia.
At the same time, according to a May 17, 2019 report
by The New York Times, more than 500 activists have
been killed and 210,000 people displaced by violence
since the adoption of the peace plan.27
Popular and political reaction to continued insecurity
in part sparked the controversial and now rescinded
policy of the military to increase its kill count. According to a New York Times story, the chief of the armed
forces named by Duque, Nicacio Martínez Espinel,
briefly issued an order for soldiers to “double the
results” of their combat missions against guerrillas,
paramilitary groups and illicit organizations. The revelation added to human rights concerns surrounding
Martínez Espinel. Earlier, Martínez Espinel had been
linked to the “false positives” scandal under President
Uribe when military commanders ordered their units
to boost their kill rates and offered them incentives
for meeting the targets. The policy allegedly led to
5,000 extra-judicial killings including of civilians
that soldiers dressed as guerrillas to increase their
“numbers.” Between October 2004 and January 2006,
Martínez Espinel held a top post in a brigade accused
of, at least, 283 extrajudicial executions in the Caribbean departments of La Guajira and Cesar.28 Martínez
Espinel says he only served in an administrative
capacity in the unit.
Across the border in Venezuela, there are also numerous security challenges, and with them, political
challenges. Irrespective of the outcome of the political, economic and humanitarian crisis, illicit armed
groups, narcotics trafficking, a deeply corrupted and
politicized Venezuelan military, and the proliferation
of weapons and paramilitary groups in Venezuela are
threatening Colombian security. Should the Maduro
regime either remain in power or violently collapse, the presence of these weapons in corrupt hands
will likely present severe challenges to Colombia’s
security situation and political system. Former FARC
leaders accused of narcotics corruption, including
Luciano Marín (“Iván Márquez”) and Hernán Darío
Velásquez (“El Paisa”), who have refused to integrate
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as part of the peace plan, have taken up residence
across the border in Venezuela, where they continue
their illegal and violent activities, including supporting violent, illicit networks and former combatants
in Colombia. Meanwhile, the ELN also continues
to operate in Venezuelan territory from where it
launches attacks and coordinates operations with the
Venezuelan military.
The most violent and polarizing example of this was
the Ejercito de Liberación Nacional’s (ELN) attack on
the police-training center in Bogotá in January 2019.
Thousands of Colombians marched in opposition to
the attacks that killed 22 people and was allegedly
hatched across the border in Venezuela. It is there
that the ELN has taken refuge and operates with
impunity. The incident ended the peace talks with the
ELN, with President Duque demanding the extradition of ELN negotiators from Cuba. The event both
reinforced suspicion and fear about what is brewing
across the border with Venezuela and cast even
further doubt on the peace plan with the FARC.
Under the governments of former President Hugo
Chávez and current President Nicolás Maduro,
Venezuela has also become chock-full of a wide range
of weapons. While many of them are already in the
hands of criminals and paramilitary groups, given the
corruption in the Venezuelan military, many more
will likely be sold to criminals in the event of a regime
change and find their way across the border. According to a May 2, 2019, Foreign Policy article, Venezuela’s government has “purchased Russia’s state-of-theart S-300 anti-aircraft missiles; imported hundreds
of thousands of Kalashnikov rifles and ammunition;
and acquired 5,000 Igla-S MANPADS (man-portable
air defense systems.)” This may only be the tip of the
iceberg. The count of the above-mentioned weapons
is based on what has been seen, though there are
likely more weapons of various types in the hands of
paramilitary groups like the collectives and criminal networks, and a long-anticipated Russian-built
Kalashnikov factory is finally expected to start
churning out rifles by the end of 2019 at a supposed
rate of 25,000 guns per year. Many of the weapons
are already in the hands of unaccountable agents—
including the military—with some of them already
being acquired by neighboring criminal groups such
as Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC). A
further deterioration of the situation in Venezuela
will likely mean that even more of these weapons will
find themselves into the hands of criminal groups.

27. Casey, Nicholas, “Colombia’s Peace Deal Promised a New Era. So Why Are These Rebels Rearming?” The New York Times, The New
York Times, May 17, 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/world/americas/colombia-farc-peace-deal.html [Last accessed 6/5/19]
28. Manetto, Francesco, “El Jefe Del Ejército De Colombia Dirigió Una Brigada Acusada De Matar a Civiles.” El País, Ediciones El País
S.L., June 5, 2019, http://elpais.com/internacional/2019/06/04/colombia/1559607159_600734.html [Last accessed 6/10/19]
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FIGURE 2
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FIGURE 3

Colombia’s GDP Growth 2008 to 2023
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Most troubling is the potential transfer of the MANPADs to terrorist and criminal organizations.
The persistence of criminal and guerrilla groups
(often indistinguishable) across the border and the
presence of weapons in insecure hands will increase
security challenges in Colombia, regardless of what
may occur in Venezuela in the medium term. Eventually, in some form, regime change will occur in Venezuela. That change will inevitably lead to a shift in
power that will reshuffle criminal elements associated with the Maduro government and those given safe
harbor passively or actively within its borders.
For the moment, however, homicides continue to decline. The most recent statistics reveal that in 2017, the
homicide rate per 100,000 people had dropped to 24,
an all-time low according to the UNDOC. (See Figure
2 for numbers before 2017.) Nevertheless, despite
this impressive data, according to a 2018 Cámara de
Comercio de Bogotá survey, 53 percent of Colombians
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believed crime had increased, a 3 percent increase
from 2017. According to the Brookings Institution,
Venezuelans have committed 0.4 percent of crimes
in Colombia in 2018 and make up just 0.9 percent of
the total population. The crime rate is actually lower
among refugee and migrant Venezuelans.29 A survey
completed in April 2019 by the Brookings Institution
indicated that 63 percent of Colombians support the
current government’s, under President Duque’s, policy toward Venezuela, which has generally welcomed
Venezuelan refugees.30

Economy

Because of its ties to several developed and regional
markets, Colombia’s economy avoided the economic
contraction that Brazil and other countries that had
come to depend on Chinese and Indian markets have
suffered. While economic growth slowed to 1.4 percent
in 2017, it bounced back the following year to 2.7
percent growth and is predicted to grow at a steady rate
of 3.5 percent or more in the next four years. (See Figu-

29. Bahar, Dany, et al. Integrating Venezuelans into the Colombian Labor Market. Brookings Institute, December, 2018, www.brookings.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Venezuelan-Migrants_English.pdf [Last Accessed 6/18/19]
30. Dhont, Arthur, “Impact of Venezuelan Migrant Flows on Colombia.” IHS Markit, April 17, 2019, www.ihsmarkit.com/researchanalysis/impact-of-venezuelan-migrant-flows-on-colombia.html [Last accessed 6/18/19]
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FIGURE 4

Chinese investment since 2005
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in September 2013—though these are yet to enter into
force. Moreover, Colombia is currently negotiating
trade agreements with Turkey and Japan. Colombia
also has Bilateral Investment Treaties with Switzerland, Peru, and Spain.31
In 2006, the U.S. and Colombia signed a bilateral
free trade agreement, and in 2001, the U.S. Congress
approved it. The FTA marked the culmination of a
series of bilateral agreements, some related to the
agreement, others to separate issues, relating to
environmental protection, asset sharing, chemical
control, ship-boarding, renewable and clean energy,
science and technology, and civil aviation.

source: Gallagher, Kevin P., and Myers, Margaret, “China-Latin America Finance
Database,” Washington: Inter-American Dialogue, 2019, https://www.thedialogue.
org/map_list/ [Last accessed 6/10/19]

Partially as a result, U.S-Colombian economic
relations remain strong. In 2016, Colombian imports
from the U.S. totaled $11.6 billion (27 percent of total
imports, making it Colombia’s largest import partner).
So while China has become the number one export
market for countries like Brazil, Chile, and Peru, the
U.S. is still Colombia’s number one export market,
buying $10.5 billion in goods and services should be
services, or 32 percent of the country’s total exports.

re 3.) In addition to avoiding the trap of dependence on
China’s market, Colombia has also been on the lower
end of receiving Chinese investment. (See Figure 4.)
Since 2005, Colombia has only received $75 million in
foreign direct investment from the People’s Republic of
China. Per capita it is the lowest in South America and
in absolute terms is the second lowest after Uruguay
($10 million). At the same time, according to the Inter-American Dialogue’s database, during the same period, Argentina received $19 billion; Brazil $22 billion;
Chile $150 million; and Peru $2.3 billion. In short, at a
moment when economists, observers, citizens, and the
United States are raising concerns about the reliability and agenda of Chinese investment, Colombia has
avoided the temptation—and potential risks.

Part of the reason that Colombia has been able to avoid
the risks of Chinese FDI is that investment from other
countries has grown. From 2015 to 2017, the number
of foreign companies investing in Colombia grew by
17.65 percent, and the number of projects rose by 12.37
percent. In 2017 alone, FDI inflows grew, reaching
$14.5 billion, with a total stock of FDI currently
estimated at 58.8 percent of the Colombian GDP.32 The
largest share of that investment went to raw materials and more specifically, to fossil fuels. Also, there
has been a diversification of sectors and production,
beyond hydrocarbons, metals, and minerals. While
40.2 percent of 2017 flowed to oil and mining, another
17.5 percent went to manufacturing, another 12.2
percent to financial services, and 10.2 percent flowed to
transportation and communications.

Part of this is due to Colombia’s extensive network of
free trade agreements (FTAs) with diverse countries. Colombia has FTAs with the Central American
Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras), Canada, Mexico, Chile, the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries (Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein), and the
European Union. Colombia has also signed FTAs with
South Korea in February 2013, with Costa Rica in
May 2013, with Panama in June 2013, and with Israel

President Duque has also set out an ambitious national development plan, Pacto por Colombia, Pacto por
la Equidad. The four-year, $325 billion plan aims to
guarantee macroeconomic stability and boost entrepreneurship and equality. It includes investments
in science, technology, innovation, transport and
logistics, public services in water and energy, and environmental sustainability. The plan is to be financed
through a multi-annual investment plan between
2019 and 2022.

31. “Colombia- Trade Agreements.” Colombia Country Commercial Guide, International Trade Administration, August 17, 2018, https://
www.export.gov/article?id=Colombia-Trade-Agreements [Last accessed 6/5/19]
32. “World Investment Report 2018.” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The United Nations, 2018, http://unctad.
org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2018_en.pdf. [Last accessed 6/10/19]
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FIGURE 5
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Nevertheless, despite the years of steady economic
growth and the resolution of the civil war with the
FARC, poverty and inequality remain stubborn problems for the Colombian economy and society. (See
Figure 5.) While poverty rates have dropped from 41
percent of the population as recently as 2008 to 28
percent by 2017—an impressive gain—rural poverty
remains a serious challenge. So too do ethnic and
racial marginalization. Indigenous and Afro-descendant populations are overrepresented among the
poor. Part of the peace deal attempts to address these
issues of social exclusion and lack of access to markets and services for rural populations.33 The plan
proposes $7 billion for farmers and rural development, and Duque’s Pacto por Colombia includes programs to work with ethnic groups and improve access
and equality for women and people with disabilities.
At the same time, however, Duque has announced
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plans to eliminate several agencies created to oversee
rural development and instead house their activities
in the Ministry of Agriculture.34
Though Colombia’s poverty rate has decreased
significantly in almost a decade, unemployment
and underemployment continue to be of concerns. According to the Colombian government, the
unemployment rate in Colombia rose to 10.3 percent
in April 2019 from 9.5 percent in April 2018. The
number of unemployed increased by 154 thousand to
2.52 million while the number of employed declined
by 775 thousand to 21.89 million.35 Not only is the
unemployment rate increasing, but the number of
under-employed workers is also increasing. As of
2018, 26 percent of workers were considered underemployed by the Colombian government,36 many of
them likely working in the informal sector.
Colombian economist and head of Colombia’s
post-conflict commission on rural development,
José Antonio OCampo, states that although poverty
has fallen in recent years, the agricultural sector has
weakened and urban-rural inequality has increased.
About 90 percent of rural producers are smallholders who control less than 10 percent of the overall
land, with many farming plots barely able to support
a single family.37 He emphasizes the importance of
eliminating rural-urban gaps in basic social services,
providing more opportunities for smallholder
farmers, and creating more jobs for youth.38 In 2016,
the agricultural sector in Colombia represented 6.1
percent of the country’s GDP and 16.3 percent of
employment.39 These figures have the potential to
be higher. Ocampo argues that unfortunately, the
government is not carrying out the necessary rural
reforms to maximize the success of the rural sector.
According to the Latin America working group,
there are a number of initiatives being introduced
by the current administration that go against the
rural reform chapter of the peace accords, which
was intended to promote the economic integration
of Colombia’s poor rural communities through

33. “Bases Del Plan Nacional De Desarollo.” Departamento Nacional De Planeación, 2019, colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Prensa/
BasesPND2018-2022n.pdf. [Last accessed 6/10/19]
34. “Risky Business: The Duque Government’s Approach to Peace in Colombia.” International Crisis Group, International Crisis Group,
June 21, 2018, www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/67-risky-business-duque-governments-approach-peacecolombia [Last accessed 6/10/19]
35. “Gran Encuesta Integrada De Hogares (GEIH) Mercado Laboral.” Dirección Nacional De Estadística, DANE, May 31, 2019, www.
dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/mercado-laboral/empleo-y-desempleo [Last Accessed 6/18/19]
36. “Labor and Unemployment Statistics.” Colombia Reports Data, July 23, 2018, www.data.colombiareports.com/colombiaunemployment-statistics [Last accessed 6/18/19]
37. Haggart, Kelly, “José Antonio Ocampo: Social, Economic Inclusion Key to Peace in Colombia.” IDRC, October 11, 2015, www.idrc.ca/
en/article/jose-antonio-ocampo-social-economic-inclusion-key-peace-colombia?PublicationID=1424 [Last accessed 6/24/19]
38. “Misión Para La Transformación Del Campo Colombiano.” DNP Departamento Nacional De Planeación, 2016, www.dnp.gov.co/
programas/agricultura/Paginas/mision-para-la-transformacion-del-campo-colombiano.aspx [Last accessed 6/24/19]
39. “Investing in Rural People in Colombia.” International Fund for Agricultural Development, IFAD, 2016, www.ifad.org/
documents/38714170/39972349/Investing in rural people in Colombia.pdf/ee2fe52b-dab3-436c-8a2b-5f91e40d5c6d [Last accessed
6/24/19]
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land-titling, a land fund, and the extension of state
services to the countryside.40 The Land Fund, which
was created in the peace accords to increase small
farmer land ownership, has only officially received
200,000 hectares, less than 7 percent, of the 3 million
hectares it is supposed to receive by 2028. Other
important agricultural initiatives have not even been
approved by Congress yet. The lack of importance
that Duque’s administration is putting on the rural
sector will impede the future economic growth of
those living and working in rural Colombia, as well as
the country’s overall economy.
Duque’s Pacto por Colombia aims to generate 1.6 million jobs in order to bring down the unemployment
rate41 in the next four years. While this is an important goal to achieve, it will likely need to be rethought
in light of the increasing number of Venezuelan
refugees in Colombia. While there are complaints
about recent arrivals lowering wages and reducing
jobs, as Antoni Estevadeordal42 argues in The Global
Americans, the influx of refugees could actually be a
boom to the Colombian economy and the economies
of surrounding countries. Venezuelan refugees are
younger and tend to have at least a secondary education, which would yield economic growth in the long
run. For now, unfortunately, most refugees work in
the informal employment sector, causing tensions to
grow in towns like Cúcuta. As Estevadeordal writes,
however, with the proper mix of public policies and
private sector collaboration, these new arrivals could
become an economic asset.

U.S.-Colombia Diplomatic Relations

The U.S. established diplomatic relations with
Colombia in 1822, shortly after its independence
from Spain. As one of the region’s oldest democracies,
those relations remained strong after World War II.
The brief moments of interruption were the diplomatic spat over U.S. demands for the extradition of major
drug lords. In the 1980s, this pattern was exemplified
best by Pablo Escobar’s movement “los extraditables” that led to the murder of dozens of policymakers
including Senator Luis Carlos Galan and Rodrigo
Lara Bonilla—and the de-certification of Colombia
during the presidential term of President Ernesto
Samper, accused of accepting campaign funding from
narco-traffickers. Bilateral relations rebounded with
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the election of President Andrés Pastrana and deepened with the initiation of Plan Colombia in 2000;
a plan hatched and developed jointly between the
then-administrations of President Bill Clinton and
Andrés Pastrana. In an example of bi-partisan collaboration and its benefits, Plan Colombia was fully
implemented and expanded upon under the administration of George W. Bush, with the U.S. president
developing a close ideological and personal bond with
President Álvaro Uribe who succeeded Pastrana. A
result of that affinity was closer ties between the two
countries and militaries on issues of anti-terrorism—
the latter after Uribe formed a common bond with
U.S. President George W. Bush to designate the FARC
a terrorist group and the negotiation of a free-trade
agreement.

Multilateral Relations

Colombia’s stable, mature relations with the United
States are not just a bilateral phenomenon. Due in
large part to the country’s policy consistency across
administrations, going back to the term of Pastrana
(1998-2002) and the country’s professional, highly
respected diplomatic leadership, Colombia has integrated itself into regional and global organizations
beyond its multiple free trade agreements. Within the
region, Colombia has played a lead role in the creation
and evolution of the Pacific Alliance that unites Chile,
Peru, Mexico, and Colombian economies. By 2020,
tariffs between the four countries will have been
eliminated, and the stock markets are integrating.
Globally, Colombia is also in the process of becoming
a member of the OECD. President Santos initially
pushed for Colombia to become a member, believing
that doing so was essential for Colombia’s development
by establishing incentives for modernized standards
and policies. In 2018 both houses of Congress approved
the accession, and it is currently under review by
Colombia’s Constitutional Court.43 In the meantime,
Colombia has made progress in rewriting or reforming
laws and regulations to meet OECD standards in areas
of intellectual property rights, pharmaceuticals, fuel
and trucking, labor, corporate liability and anti-bribery.
44
In the words of Angel Gurría, the OECD Secretary-General, “Through the OECD accession process,
Colombia has made impressive strides in, for example,
reforming its justice system and reducing informality

40. Aponte, Andrea, “Peace Accord Implementation in Colombia: Urgent Need to Adhere to the Spirit of the Accords.” Latin America
Working Group, March 12, 2019, www.lawg.org/peace-accord-implementation-in-colombia-urgent-need-to-adhere-to-the-spirit-ofthe-accords/ [Last accessed 6/24/19] 41. “Government Presents to Congress ‘Pact for Colombia, ‘Pact for Colombia, Pact for Equity’.”
BNamericas, February 8, 2019, www.bnamericas.com/en/news/banking/government-presents-to-congress-pact-for-colombia-pactfor-equity [Last accessed 6/18/19]
42. Estevadeordal, Antoni, “Latin America: The opportunity of migration,” The Global Americans, https://theglobalamericans.
org/2019/06/latin-america-the-opportunity-of-migration/ [Last accessed 6/22/19].
43. Beittel, June S., “Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations” Congressional Research Service, February 9, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/
crs/row/R43813.pdf [Last accessed 6/10/19]
44. Ibid pp. 42
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in the labor market.”45

educational and labor demands.

Colombia has also been granted observer status in
NATO, helping to integrate its military into the operations and activities of the militaries of the NATO
countries. The designation allows Colombian military
and civilian defense officials to take part in training,
education, and exercises with NATO allies and to develop interoperability among member armed forces.
Colombian personnel regularly take part in courses
in the NATO school in Oberammergau, Germany, and
the NATO Defense College in Rome. The collaboration has also helped bring Colombian regulations and
practices in line with NATO norms and standards,
reinforcing the professionalization and operation of
the armed forces and defense policy.46

With this massive influx have also come security
concerns. This refugee crisis has led to a growth of
narcotics and arms trades across the border. Without
sufficient numbers of officials to patrol the porous
border between Colombia and Venezuela, it has become easy for criminal groups of all stripes to operate
on the border. A study done by the NGO Paz Activa
estimated that almost 200,000 migrants had been
victims of human trafficking in 2017 in their pursuit
of freedom. The ELN, a Colombian rebel group, has
been successful in operating from the Venezuelan
border and coordinating attacks in Colombia from
Venezuela.

An Outlier: Venezuela’s Future and
Venezuelan Refugees

Colombia has currently taken in over 1.3 million Venezuelan refugees, almost half of the total number of
refugees that have fled the country. Some predictions
suggest that 7 million more migrants will continue to
make the trek out of Venezuela by 2020, with many of
them heading to Colombia. The country’s proximity
has made it the easiest escape route out of Venezuela.
While many of the Venezuelan refugees have settled
along the border in Norte de Santander, many others
have continued to other areas. Because many of the
refugees are arriving as families and the social and
economic situation in Venezuela is not expected to
improve in the near term—even with a change in
government—many expect that the refugees are likely
to remain in the countries they have fled to: Colombia,
other countries in the region, and Europe.
The Colombian government and people are to be
commended for their acceptance of Venezuelans
fleeing the chaos and humanitarian crisis in their
country. However, the arrival of so many often-destitute migrants is creating strains on Colombia’s public
services in health, education, housing and the labor
market. Colombia has said that it requires $1.5 billion
to accommodate the incoming migrants. The needs
are immense. For example, in La Guajira, a Colombian border town, residents infected with HIV have
increased by 375 percent. Also, today, 75 percent of
women giving birth in border towns are Venezuelan,
requiring health care, as well as presaging future
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Despite the general openness of Colombia and
Colombians to Venezuelan refugees, there have been
signs of backlash towards Venezuelans who have
arrived and are now competing for jobs and social
services with native-born Colombians. Border towns
in Colombia such as Riohacha have tried to prevent
the arrival of more migrants because they are believed
to cut into employment and wage rates in already
impoverished areas. To discourage refugees, residents
have attacked Venezuelan arrivals, and there have
been mob attacks and protests around refugee camps.
Colombians have also complained that Venezuelans
have driven wages down by providing common jobs
for less. “A Colombian will not work for you for less
than the minimum wage,” says Arnold Bonilla, a
barber in Bogotá’s financial district. “But what I have
seen is that in some parts of town, Venezuelan barbers were working for half as much.”47
Kelvin Rojas, a 23-year-old migrant, states that
people will scream anti-Venezuelan insults and slurs
at him on the streets of Bogotá. Kelvin’s story is not
uncommon. In the fall of 2018, a Venezuelan man
was beaten to death in Bogotá due to rumors that he
was a child kidnapper to try and get the man out of
the neighborhood.48 The rumors were not true. The
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) has tried to reduce tensions by running anti-xenophobia campaigns across Colombia, but as the
outflow continues and more Venezuelans come and
remain in Colombia, the tensions will likely increase
and, as they do, they will likely have a political impact.
For now, there is no political leader or movement

45. “Colombia Officially Joins OECD, Becomes 37th Member.” USCIB, United States Council for International Business, 6 June 2018,
www.uscib.org/colombia-officially-joins-oecd-becomes-37th-member/ [Last accessed 6/10/19]
46. “Relations with Colombia.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), December 6, 2018, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
topics_143936.htm [Last accessed 6/10/19]
47. Rueda, Manuel, “‘I Get Screamed at in the Streets’: Colombia’s Patience with Venezuelan Migrants Wears Thin.” Public Radio
International (PRI), Public Radio International, May 10, 2019, www.pri.org/stories/2019-05-10/i-get-screamed-streets-colombiaspatience-venezuelan-migrants-wears-thin [Last accessed 6/10/19]
48. Ibid
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that is rallying popular opposition to the Venezuelan
influx. However, it is possible, as it continues and as
tensions increase, that some political leaders at the
local and national level will attempt to take advantage
of it by mobilizing and fanning nationalist, xenophobic
sentiments.
The government has made efforts to try and regulate the crisis by increasing border assistance in
healthcare, especially in situations of childbirth, and
by allowing documentation requirements to become
more flexible to enable child migrants to have access
to basic education.49 Colombia has tried to initiate a
policy that is supposed to come into action within the
next few years to provide support in areas such as labor
integration, healthcare, childcare, and the like.
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THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY: SCENARIOS FOR COLOMBIA BY 2030
Most Likely
Scenario by 2030

Opportunities

Challenges

Best Case Scenario

Worst Case Scenario

Politics

The party system will stumble
along but will produce centrist
candidates for the presidency.
That will reduce the
polarization of presidential
elections post-2018.
Nevertheless, the party system
will remain fragmented and
unpredictable.

Centrist governments will
allow for U.S. and SouthCom
collaboration with Colombia,
especially on security issues
stemming from the peace deal
and Venezuelan migration and
reconstruction. This
collaboration with SouthCom
could also extend to the DEA
and provide new strategies and
partnerships to combat
narcotics trafficking and illicit
activities on the border.

Duque’s unpopularity opens
up the political field to outsider
candidates. Without the
emergence of a centrist option
or centrist candidates, the
current array of political forces
will favor outsider, populist
candidates. There is also the
risk of a xenophobic backlash
to the flow of Venezuelan
refugees to Colombia and the
insertion of groups involved in
illicit activities into politics.

In the next presidential
election, the party system
converges back around the
center, either around
traditional party organizations
or newly formed ones, with
greater consensus on the
country’s path forward on
matters of security,
market-based economic
development, and anticorruption.

In future presidential elections,
parties on either side of the
political spectrum continue to
move to the margins, further
polarizing the party system and
the electorate, leading to the
election of an anti-system
president.

Security

The core of FARC are
demobilized through the
current and upcoming peace
agreements, yet the vacuums
created are filled by new
criminal organizations.
Colombia continues to be a
leader in cocaine production
and commercialization.

The peace agreement offers
the unique opportunity to
demobilize and disarm
combatants. If accompanied
with development strategies
that contribute to avoiding the
creation of economic and
power vacuums. The reduced
threat of FARC allows the
military to engage in a new
conceptual security strategy
with U.S. collaboration.

As older criminal organizations
are dismantled, historical
trends suggest that they will be
replaced with newer ones as
the state struggles to fill the
vacuums in rural areas. This
difficulty will allow for weapons
to find their way across the
Colombian border in more
significant numbers, further
destabilizing the situation and
increasing criminal and
terrorist groups’ fire power.

The peace agreement is
successful, and FARC no
longer needs to be confronted
as a guerrilla movement,
allowing Colombia to focus on
combatting other illegal
activities and groups, allowing
for greater collaboration with
the United States.

The peace process fails to
reduce violence and integrate
former combatants into civilian
life fully and is rejected
politically. This failure leads to
the resurgence of armed groups
and new criminal organizations,
causing violence and criminality
to increase drastically. An
outsider, anti-system president
is elected and attempts to
politicize the military,
furthering dividing the country.

Economy
and Trade

Colombia’s GDP and FDI
steadily increase, and the
economy continues to
diversify. Though growth will
likely continue, the risk of
insecurity from the peace
agreements, criminal
organizations and corruption
will dampen potential. The
various trade agreements that
Colombia has with other
countries will remain
important.

Continuing the U.S. and
Colombia’s strong economic
ties allows for the relationship
between the two countries in
other sectors to remain
healthy. If the U.S. continues
to invest in Colombia, it will
incentivize other countries to
do so as well, which would reap
benefits for both the U.S. and
Colombia

The growth in crime and
insecurity from the incomplete
implementation of the peace
agreement and the crisis in
Venezuela become a drag on
GDP growth and investor
confidence. President Duque’s
plans to eliminate multiple
rural development agencies
will undermine efforts to
develop the rural sector.
OECD accession requirements
also constrain public spending
in crucial areas.

Colombia’s GDP increases as
predicted, allowing for the
services and manufacturing
sectors to continue to grow.
The successful implementation
of the peace agreement
contributes to the
development of rural sectors.
OECD rules ensure
macroeconomic stability and
fiscal responsibility without
becoming a straight jacket.

The peace process fails, and
anti-corruption reforms are
unable to address the root
causes of corruption and crime,
resulting in greater insecurity
and public anger, deterring
investors. FDI decreases, and
GDP increases at a slower rate
than predicted. The illicit
economy grows and
undermining the legal
economy, in its access to
credit, markets, and fair
competition.

U.S.Colombia
Relations

U.S-Colombian relations
across a range of issues—
security, diplomacy, and
economic— remain strong and
close, despite a few bumps due
to politics in both countries.
The relationship endures even
if an outsider candidate is
elected in Colombia between
now and 2030.

Both the positive and negative
developments that flow from
the peace plan allow the U.S.
and Colombia to re-strategize
their security relations. The
Venezuelan refugee crisis and
the humanitarian crisis inside
Venezuela provide an
opportunity to deepen those
relations through regional and
global leadership.

Political volatility in both
countries test the relationship,
especially if an outsider
candidate sympathetic to
elements of chavismo, or with
ties to nationalist, antiVenezuelan sentiment or illicit
groups become prominent
political actors.

Politics and partisanship return
to the center, even over the
peace deal. The U.S. and
Colombia collaborate on a
range of bilateral, regional and
global issues, including not
limited to: Colombian security,
regional security, rebuilding
Venezuela post-Maduro,
anti-corruption, and shoring up
liberal international institutions
and processes.

As public frustration grows, an
outsider, anti-system
candidate is elected in
Colombia who attempts to roll
back collaboration with the
U.S. and reduce the country’s
participation in multilateral
projects. Citing national
sovereignty an outsider,
populist government also
reduces its cooperation with
the US.

Multilateral
Institutions

Colombia becomes a member
of the OECD. The Pacific
Alliance continues to integrate
as tariffs disappear. The
CPTPP, however, remains
stalled without clear leadership
by the United States.

The Venezuela crisis can
provide a moment for
Colombia to serve a leadership
role in helping to channel
humanitarian and
reconstruction assistance.
Colombia’s integration into
global networks helps sustain
the rule of law and economic
stability.

Meeting all the governance
and fiscal conditions of OECD
will challenge Colombia’s
economic flexibility, especially
in meeting its peace agreement
obligations and Venezuelan
refugee crisis. This could be
eased through the OECD’s
“unusual event clause.”

The Pacific Alliance allows for
trade relations to deepen
within the region. Trade will
continue to grow as the tariffs
with the U.S. disappear by
2020. Colombia becomes a
new member of the OECD.
The CPTPP will go fully into
effect and will combine the
economies of its 11 current
signatories.

Colombia fails to adhere to the
OECD’s fiscal requirements
due to the growing migration
crisis and is forced to put
accession on hold. The election
of an outsider candidate leads
to Colombia putting the
brakes on the Pacific Alliance,
NATO cooperation and
regional cooperation.

Venezuelan
Refugee
Crisis

Refugee flows continue to
grow as predicted. The border
becomes more dangerous. As
strains on public services and
labor markets become more
evident, xenophobia increases.
While international support
finally arrives to assist host
countries, it is insufficient.

SouthCom will have the
opportunity to assist in the
provision of humanitarian aid.
The region will also come
together and accept specific
amounts of collective
responsibility for a coordinated
international effort led by
regional governments.

The border remains porous,
allowing for not only human
trafficking but also trafficking
in arms and narcotics, which
provide a challenge for
SouthCom, the DEA and
Colombian counterparts. The
OECD imposes its fiscal
regulations creating a funding
constraint for the Colombian
government.

The current growing number
of refugees stabilizes and
allows for Colombia to
accommodate the refugees
adequately. Xenophobia in
Colombia is reduce through
anti-xenophobia campaigns.
The international donor
community coheres and
quickly provides the funding at
necessary levels.

The numbers continues to rise
and spike as Venezuela
collapses even further.
Colombia struggles to
integrate the refugees.
Xenophobia increases, with
politicians mobilizing voters
against the Venezuelan
refugee community. Violence
overall increases and the
border area becomes a hotbed
of illicit activity across both
countries.
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Recommendations

•R
 etain close organizational and personal ties
between the Colombian and U.S., armed services.
By reinforcing training relations, institutional and
educational ties, and collaboration both within
Colombia and outside, the U.S. military will also be
well placed to be a quiet force to address growing
human rights concerns in Colombia’s military
policy. Along with the recent uproar over the memo
urging soldiers to increase their kill count—since
rescinded—there is also the brewing crisis over
the appointment of high-level military officials
allegedly linked to the 2008 false positive scandal.
By remaining both close to the Colombia military
through different levels and in different functions,
the U.S. military is well placed to discreetly push for
more human rights accountability within its partners’ units. Closeness is essential not just in itself
but also as a means of preserving the U.S. military’s
principled place in Colombian politics across future
administrations. Given the country’s shifting partisan dynamics, it is essential that the U.S. military’s
ties through training, planning and equipment
sharing remain based on issues of U.S. principles
and values. A situation in which a future Colombian
president and party potentially antagonistic to U.S.
influence attempt to dial back relations between the
two countries’ armed forces based on allegations—
true or false—that U.S. military relations had passively or actively undermined human rights would do
severe damage to relations for both partners.
•D
 evelop a bilateral partnership to request and
help program international refugee assistance for
Venezuelans fleeing the humanitarian crisis in their
country.
The tragedy in Venezuela is an opportunity for Colombia, the United States, and other countries in the
region to lead a historic response. This collaboration
would work across all the sectors of the relationship, including diplomatic, security, academic, and
economic. In this, SouthCom can play an active role
in both assisting in the logistics of the delivery of
assistance but also in working with counterparts
in-country to ensure the security of the areas where
assistance is delivered. Insofar as other countries are
also brought into the process, SouthCom can build of
its relationships with those other militaries for the
same purposes, and eventually—optimistically—in
the reconstruction of a professional, non-political,
civilian-controlled Venezuelan military. In this, the
U.S. government should follow Colombia’s lead of
accepting—so far—1.3 million refugees and grant
Venezuelans fleeing the humanitarian disaster Temporary Protected Status (TPS).
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•Work to reduce political polarization.
Colombia’s political polarization that led to the
stark 2018 choices in the presidential election
stems from two factors: the collapse of the country’s
party system, and the deep, sharp popular divide
over the country’s peace plan. While the former
is difficult to address through bilateral relations
between sovereign nations—though U.S.-Colombia
collaboration on some of the issues driving that collapse such as widespread anger over corruption and
lack of accountability can help—the U.S. can play
a direct role in reducing the polarization over the
peace deal. One of the central concerns of Colombians over the deal is that the demobilization of the
FARC will lead to greater insecurity and crime. Part
of that is already happening. Without necessarily
embracing the controversial peace plan, the United
States can work to address those concerns. One
of the first steps should be for representatives of
both countries—civilians and the armed forces—to
develop a comprehensive strategy to secure peace
and the rule of law in those areas affected postpeace. In short, given the challenges of Venezuelan
refugees, other elements of the humanitarian crisis
in Venezuela, and after the peace deal with the
FARC, it may be time for a new partnership between
Colombia and the United States. Addressing those
pressing issues and popular concerns stemming
from them is essential not just for Colombia’s security, but also its political health.
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